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Abstract— The paper analyses the problem of information 
in the cattle market, particularly as it relates to the status of 
animal health, and discusses ways to limit it with the view to 
improving social surplus. Against this background, it aims to 
achieve three major objectives. Firstly, it describes the ways of 
improving the level of information through such schemes  as 
Conventional  Warranties  and  Third  Party  Certification  and 
the  different  choices  made  by  sellers  and  buyers  in  the 
presence  of  these  schemes.  Secondly,  it  studies  the  various 
ways by which these schemes make an impact on equilibria in 
different  markets (i.e., the pooling market and the premium 
market), and, consequently, on the social surplus. Thirdly, it 
identifies  the  necessary  conditions  for  a  third  party/public 
decision-maker  to  increase  social  surplus  and  reduce  the 
negative  externality  caused  by  disease  by  managing  and 
supporting  Third  Party  Certification.  The  paper  shows  that 
product  certification  and  product  warranty  cannot  coexist 
because  product  warranty  is  suboptimal.  It  also  shows  that 
certification,  and  a  possible  supporting  of  certification  or 
animal testing does not necessarily improve the safety of the 
trade. 
Keywords—  Asymmetric  information  –  Third-party 
certification ––Disease Externalities 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since  Akerlof  (1970)  introduced  the  world  to  his 
“market  for  lemons”,  there  has  been  a  wide 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  incomplete 
information  in  different  markets.  As a  result  of  this 
recognition,  a  number  of  papers  have  been  written 
which  purport  to  discuss  incomplete  information, 
particularly  information  asymmetry,  and  point  out 
possible  ways  of  limiting  it.  Notable  papers  in  this 
respect include Spence (1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Allen (1993), to 
name just a few. In the cattle market, which forms the 
focus of our paper, the problem of information is quite 
prominent;  even  though  the  health  status  of  the 
animals  is  important  information  for  the  buyer,  this 
information is rarely directly observable. A number of 
papers have investigated the nature of the problem in 
this market from different angles. Allen (1993) looks 
at  the  phenomenon  of    Holstein  veal  calves 
dominating live beef auctions in British Columbia as a 
reflection of the problem of asymmetric information in 
the market. Carriquiry and Babcock (2004), however, 
argue  that  the  information  problem  prevalent  in  the 
market should not necessarily be one of asymmetry. In 
fact, they argue that given that delivered quality can 
only be imperfectly learned and affected stochastically 
by producers, the problem of information can be both 
symmetric and asymmetric.  
For contagious diseases, farm infection often arises 
either through contact with the environment or through 
contact  with  neighbouring  farms  and  with  wild 
animals.  However,  such  an  infection  can  also 
sometimes  arise  through  trade  involving  infected 
animals.  If  they  know  that  the  environment  is  the 
source  of  infection,  farmers  can  take  biosecurity 
measures to separate their herd from the environment. 
However,  if  the  source  of  infection  is  known  to  be 
trade  involving  infected  animals,  it  is  not  easy  for 
them to take any particular measure as the sources of 
such an infection are varied and difficult to identify. 
To  protect  their  herd  from  the  impact  of  disease 
introduced to their farms some farmers decide not to 
buy any animals and work as closed herds (Ezanno et 
al, 2006). Other farmers sometimes revaccinate their 
cattle  after  purchase,  but  cannot  be  efficient  for  all 
pathogens  (Chymis  et  al.,  2007).  In  the  face  of 
uncertainty  regarding  the  source  of  infection  in  the 
market  place  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  resort  to 
these measures.  
Infection through purchase of an infected animal is 
known  to  reduce  the  productivity  and  increase  the 
mortality  rate  among  herds.  Furthermore,  disease 
spread triggered by the purchase of infected animals 
can at times have direct impact on human health or on 
the farm system. In order to promote social welfare, 
diseases that have nationwide implications are often   2 
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regulated with the community assuming the risk. But 
diseases whose impact is limited to the farm are not so 
regulated and, consequently, farmers are left to bear 
the cost of containing disease spread. In practice this 
distinction  is  not  clear  cut.  In  Great  Britain,  policy 
makers are often concerned that stakeholders pay for 
improvements in animal health in proportion to their 
benefit (Defra et al, 2004). This makes it particularly 
important  to  understand  the  market  mechanisms 
involved. 
For some such diseases as BVDV
1, the status of the 
animal  purchased  is  not  well  known  at  the  time  of 
trading because there is no apparent disease symptom. 
In this particular instance, buyers have two choices: 
either to take a major risk of infection by not testing 
the  animal  purchased  or  to  test  the  animal  after 
purchase.  There  are  different  tests  for  verifying  the 
disease-free status of the animal. However, results are 
not always perfect. Even though testing of the animal 
after purchase might limit the spread of the disease, 
contact  of  purchased  animals  with  the  herd  often 
occurs before the test result is received by the farmer. 
Given the limited effectiveness of testing in dealing 
with the problem of infection through trade, therefore, 
the buyer settles for acquiring information regarding 
the health status of the animal traded. 
Knowledge  of  an  attribute  reflecting  the  health 
status of an animal allows the buyer to reduce the risk 
of introducing the disease to their own farm. Sellers 
can  provide  this  knowledge  by  supplying  animals 
whose  disease  status  is  known  at  a  premium  price. 
They can make this attribute known to the buyer via, 
among others, Conventional Warranty (CW) and Third 
Party  Certification  (TPC),  contractual  terms,  repeat 
purchases, brand names and share contracts (Centner 
and Wetzstein., 1987). If the buyer knows the seller, 
he can place trust in the latter
2. But when the buyer 
does not know the seller, it is often the case that he is 
ignorant  of  the  status  of  the  farm  from  which  the 
animal purchased originated.  
There are a number of instances which give rise to 
CW and TPC. Taking the French cattle market as an 
                                                       
1.  bovine viral diarrhea virus 
2.  With imperfect information for the seller, the extent of  
repeat purchase or trust is limited. But it can be possible because 
even  if  the  information  is  incomplete  for  the  seller,  there  is 
asymmetric information. 
instance, for regulated diseases, buyers are protected 
by  latent  defect  warranties,  and  the  introduction  of 
testing  of  animals  is  obligatory  for  diseases  like 
brucellosis, tuberculosis and IBR
3. For BVDV, a not 
so regulated disease, there is, in Brittany, a plan of 
certification  of  the  animals  managed  by  the  GDS 
(Groupements  de  Défense  Sanitaire).  These  are 
voluntary  producers'  associations  working  on 
managing  farm  animal  diseases.  Indirect  methods, 
such as testing bulk tank milk, allow the identification 
of  farm  status  without  testing  all  the  animals,  and 
deductive methods identify the status of animals. In 
the case of BVDV, the "Référentiel non IPI" (FNGDS, 
2005), which is a protocol of certification of farms and 
animals, is used. Herd certification is also used in the 
case of paratuberculosis as the quality of the test is not 
sufficient to certify animals disease-free individually. 
When there is no latent defect warranty in place for 
diseases that are not so regulated, the seller and the 
buyer can also vote for a “Conventional Warranty”. 
Such  a  warranty  gives  buyers  a  cashback  guarantee 
when they return the animal to the original seller if the 
animal is found to be infected within a short period 
after purchase. This warranty applies to diseases like 
paratuberculosis  and  BVDV  but  is  limited  by  the 
quality  of  the  tests.  By  ensuring  the  safety  of  the 
transaction, this kind of market can have an impact on 
the level of disease prevalence. The prevalence of the 
disease can, in turn, have an impact on the potential 
supply and demand for animals with a known disease 
status.  
Against  this  background,  this  paper  sets  out  to 
analyse  the  problem  of  information  in  the  cattle 
market,  particularly  as  it  relates  to  animal  health 
status, and discusses ways of limiting it with the view 
to improving social surplus. In this respect, it aims to 
achieve three major objectives. Firstly, it describes the 
ways of improving the level of information through 
such  schemes  as  CW  and  TPC  and  the  different 
choices made by sellers and buyers in the presence of 
these schemes. Secondly, it studies the various ways 
by which these schemes make an impact on the market 
equilibrium, and, consequently, on the social surplus. 
Thirdly,  it  identifies  the  necessary  conditions  for  a 
third  party/public  decision-maker  to  increase  social 
                                                       
3.  Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis   3 
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surplus and reduce the negative externality caused by 
disease by managing and supporting TPC. 
II. MODELING ACTORS DECISION  
The information problem analysed is characterised 
by (1) the availability of limited information regarding 
the status of the animal for the buyer and for the seller 
and  (2)  an  asymmetry  of  information  whereby  the 
seller has full information about the health status of 
their cattle, but the buyer has imperfect information 
regarding  the  health  status  of  animals  traded  (i.e., 
he/she  has  a  perception  of  the  average  level  of  the 
health status of animals in the market). In this context, 
we  describe  three  types  of  transaction;  one  without 
either  warranties  or  third  party  certification  (WW), 
another one with TPC and a third one with punctual 
contract, (CW). Following Chymis et al. (2007), we 
define for each type of transaction the benefit B for 
seller  and the cost  C  for the  buyer. These  cost and 
benefit are a function of the level of disease incidence 
(or level of prevalence), πb for the buyer’s farm and πs 
for  the  seller’s  farm
4.  The  average  value  of  the 
prevalence,  π ,  is  also  the  average  risk  to  buy  an 
infected animal. Regardless of the type of exchange 
that prevails in the market, we assume that farmers are 
risk neutral and honest in their dealings and that either 
they maximise expected benefit or minimise expected 
cost once involved in trade. Given these assumptions, 
the seller maximises the expected benefit B of selling 
an animal consisting of the price of the animal minus 
expected cost due to disease risk whereas the buyer 
minimises C, the expected cost of buying an animal 
consisting of the price of the animal plus expected cost 
due to disease risk. 
A. Trade without disease information (WW) 
Firstly, consider trade without disease information, 
where  there  is  only  one  price  which  rules  in  the 
market,  i.e.,  the  price  in  the  pooling  market.  In  the 
absence of full information regarding the health status 
of the animal purchased, the buyer has two decision 
options; either to buy the animal without testing or test 
                                                       
4.  because  of  lack  of  information  πb  and  πs  can  be  a 
perceived prevalence of the disease.  
the animal after purchase. If the decision is to buy the 
animal without testing, then the buyer's expected cost 
of purchase is:  
 
, b WW WW c P C ⋅ + = π   (1) 
 
where PWW is the price in the pooling market, and cb is 
the cost of infection when the buyer b purchases an 
infected animal, with a probability π . We assume that 
cb is a continuous function of πb, c(πb), which satisfies 
c(πb) ≥ 0  and  c’,  the  first  derivative  of  c  satisfies 
c’(πb) ≤ 0.  This  states  that  the  impact  of  the 
introduction of an infected animal is more important in 
the naive farm than in an infected farm because the 
risk of infection on such a farm is higher than on one 
whose herds are more resistant to infection. Beyond 
the individual cost of the introduction of an infected 
animal,  purchase  without  testing  causes  a  negative 
externality  as  it  increases  infection  risk  for  the 
neighbourhood and the buyers by raising the level of 
disease  prevalence.  This  effect,  in  essence,  is  not 
considered by the buyer. 
If the decision is to buy an animal and test it after 
purchase, then the buyer keeps on purchasing to the 
extent that the animal is not infected and that animals 
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=
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where Ct is the cost of the test, Pc is the benefit of 
culling the animal, and Co is the opportunity cost of 
keeping the animal on farm. To simplify the model, 
we assume that the test is perfect (i.e., there is neither 
a  false  positive  nor  a  false  negative  case),  and  that 
there  is  no  longer  any  risk  of  infection  once  the 
infected  animal  is  culled.  See  Annex  1  for  the 
derivation of this equation. 
When animals are not differentiated by their health 
status,  then,  in  the  absence  of  full  information 
regarding  their  health  status,  there  is  an  apparent 
homogeneity of the rate of prevalence among different 
farms. In this context, the seller has no choice but to 
sell at the pooling price with an expected benefit, 
 
WW WW P B =   (3)   4 
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B. Trade with Third Party Certification (TPC) 
Now consider the choices of the buyer and of the 
seller  when  the  market  involves  TPC.  In  such  a 
market, the cost of buying an animal is specified as: 
 
TPC TPC P C =   (4) 
   
where  PTPC  denotes  the  premium  price  paid  for  a 
certified  animal.  To simplify  the  model,  we  assume 
that the TPC is so perfect as a test that all animals sold 
under the scheme are uninfected. The benefit to the 
seller of selling a certified animal is given by  
 
( ) Cc Pc P B s TPC s TPC − ⋅ + ⋅ − = π π 1   (5) 
 
where Cc is a predetermined cost of certification
5. We 
assume  that  the  animal  is  culled  once  it  is  infected 
(i.e., once it fails the certification stage); so seller sells 
at  price  PTPC  with  a  probability  1 – πs  and  culls the 
animal with a probability πs.  
C. Trade with Conventional Warranty 
Finally, consider the choices of the buyer and of the 
seller  when  the  market  involves  CW.  Assume  that, 
given  this  exchange  regime,  the  buyer  tests  every 
traded animal and keeps on purchasing to the extent 
that such an animal is not infected
6. The expected cost 














  (6) 
 
The derivation of (6) is the same as of (2), except 
that Pc – Co is replaced by Cr – Co'. Cr denotes the 
cashback  whose  components  are  the  price  of  the 
animal bought with CW, PCW, and a part of Co'
7, the 
                                                       
5.  We could also assume that Cc depends on the level of 
prevalence in the seller farm. 
6.  Therefore we ignore the case where the buyer does not 
test the animal because he assumes that animals sold with CW 
are less likely to be infected. But even this case can be studied 
using the theory of games. 
7.  Note that the possibility to test the animal on the seller's 
farm can reduce Co’, but here, we assume that the buyer trades 
cost  of  purchase  and  of  return  plus  the  opportunity 
cost of doing so. Here,  CW π  is the perceived average 
risk  to  buy  an  animal  infected  in  the  case  of  the 
Conventional Warranty, this average risk must be less 
than π , because farms with a high level of disease do 
not  trade  with  Conventional  Warranty.  When 
Cr = PCW + Co' + Ct, we have a perfect warranty for 
the buyer with CCW = PCW + Ct.  
The  expected  benefit  to  the  seller  of  selling  an 
animal with CW is given by:  
 
( ) Pc Cr P B s CW CW − ⋅ − = π   (7) 
 
The  assumption  here  is  that  the  seller  culls  the 
animal  if  returned  by  the  buyer.  In  this  case,  the 
benefit of the seller is composed of the price of the 
animal  PCW    minus  the  cost  when  the  animal  is 
returned,  composed  of  the  cashback  Cr    minus  the 
benefit of culling the animal Pc, balanced by πs.  
D. Coexistence of Conventional Warranty and Third Party 
Certification 
To this stage, the implicit assumption has been that 
CW and TPC coexist. We can assume that Cr, the cash 
back  for  the  buyer  when he  returns  an  animal  with 
Conventional Warranty is greater than the direct costs 
of the trade, composed of the cost of the animal and 
the cost of the test on farm, and lower than the total 
cost of the trade, composed of the direct cost and the 
opportunity cost. So, Cr satisfies:  
 
' + + ≤ ≤ + Co Ct P C C P CW r t CW   (8) 
 
Given this assumption, seller s trading in a market 
with CW requires that : 
 
( ) Cc Ct Cr Ct P CW s − > − + ⋅ π   (9) 
 
For  proof,  see  Annex  2.  The  logic  goes  as  follows. 
Since  the  test  guarantees  no  infection  (this  is  in 
accordance  with  the  hypothesis  of  perfect  test  and 
perfect certification), we have Cc < Ct. So, when the 
cashback Cr is greater than the cost of buying, PCW, 
                                                                                         
in a pooled market where there is no possibility for testing the 
animal before trade.   5 
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plus the cost of testing Ct, TPC drives out CW from 
the market. Thus, in the following, we discuss market 
equilibrium with TPC only.  
III. DERIVATION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 FUNCTIONS OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS 
In  this  section,  we  identify  the  conditions  under 
which equilibrium exists in a cattle market where TPC 
operates.  
To  help  identify  these  conditions,  consider  a 
hypothetical market where the price of animals trade 
without  warranty  PWW  and  the  risk  of  buying  an 
infected  animal  without  certification  are  given. This 
assumption holds when the market for cattle operates 
at  a  global  level  whereas  the  market  for  certified 
animals operates at the local level, because in such a 
market, animal without certification are bought on the 
global market and local actors do not impact the global 
market  and  the  global  epidemiology.  Consider  also 
that the number of animals traded is given, because the 
surplus given to buyers and sellers by the TPC do not 
impact their supply or demand. 
In  this  market,  the  following  assumptions  hold: 
firstly, the buyer does not choose the seller; secondly, 
he buys at an equilibrium price because the product 
(i.e.,  cattle)  being  traded  in  the  two  markets  is 
homogeneous; and, thirdly, neither the seller nor the 
buyer  has  market  power.  Assume  that  sellers  and 
buyers are characterised only by the level of disease 
prevalence  among  their  cattle,  which  is  linearly 
distributed  in  the  population,  and  that  they  have 
perfect knowledge of market price, of cost and of risk. 
Furthermore,  assume  that  all  buyers  (respectively 
sellers)  buy  (respectively  sell)  the  same  number  of 
animals. Since for each buyer (respectively seller), the 
maximum  (respectively  minimum)  price  premium  at 
which he buys (respectively sells) an animal with TPC 
is  a  function  of  πb  (respectively  πs),  we  can  derive 
partial supply and demand functions for the certified 
animal  and,  define  the  resulting  equilibrium  in  the 
market. 
Let θs (respectively θb) be the proportion of sellers 
(respectively buyers) who verify πs ≤ πθs (respectively 
πb ≤ πθb).  With  the  same  uniform  distribution  for 
















s   (10) 
 
We used here a uniform distribution and the same 
distribution for sellers and buyers, but the same results 
follow any other continuous distributions. 
As mentioned earlier, the seller chooses TPC if and 
only if BWW > BTPC  whereas the buyer chooses TPC if 
and only if CWW < CTPC. Given these choices, we can 
derive the prices prefs and prefb at which  s θ  sellers 
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For prefb1(θ0) = prefb2 , θ0 represents the proportion 
of buyers who buy and test in a market where there is 
no TPC. 
Consider Φ to be the proportion of animals traded 
with TPC. Assume that all the buyers and sellers trade 
the  same  number  of  animals,  then  we  have  Φ = θb. 
Due to culling of infected animals prior to trade, we 
have  Φ = θs · (1 – π  · θs).  We  can  derive  the 
equilibrium conditions as: 
 




























   (12b)  
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Equation  (12a)  represents  the  supply  condition  S 
whereas  (12b)  represents  the  demand  condition  D. 
They are used to derive equilibrium in Figures 1 & 2 
below yielding the proportion, Ф*, of certified animals 
traded at the premium price, PTPC*. We represent also 
the preference curve prefs. The area between the prefs 
curve  and  PTPC*  represents  the  surplus  to  sellers 
offered by TPC whereas the area between the Demand 
curve D (ie the prefb curve) and PTPC*, represents the 
surplus to buyers offered by TPC.  
The maximum value between Ф* and θ0 give the 
proportion of safe trade, so the proportion of animals 
exchanged are either certified or tested after purchase. 
In  the  following,  we  consider  three  scenarios  under 
which  we  determine  the  gain  from  trade  with 
certification. The first applies for Ф* > θ0, the second 
when  Ф* < θ0  holds  and  the  third  when  the  supply 
curve does not cross the demand curve.  
 






Figure 1. Improvement of trade safety (Scenario 1) 
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A. Scénario 1: Improvement of trade safety 
When Ф* > θ0, both the seller and the buyer gain 
a positive economic surplus. The test after purchase 
is suboptimal and is driven out by certification. The 
supply  and  demand  in  such  a  scenario  are 
represented  in  Figure  1.  Under  this  scenario,  a 
proportion,  Ф*,  of  buyers  buy  with  certification 
whereas a proportion, 1 - Ф*, of buyers buy without 
certification and do not test their purchased animals. 
With  the  introduction  of  TPC,  the  proportion  of 
animals  exchanged  with  the  maximum  level  of 
safety  increases  by  θ0 – Ф*.  Consequently,  the 
negative externality caused by the trade of infected 










Figure 2. :Transfer of responsibility from buyer to seller (Scenario 2)   8 
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B. Scenario 2: Transfer of responsibility from buyer to 
seller 
When Ф* < θ0, the seller gains economic surplus 
from trading in the certified market but the buyer 
does not. The supply and demand in such a scenario 
are represented in Figure 2. In the certified market, 
the price is given by prefb2. There is a proportion θ0 
of  buyers  who  do  not  choose  between  testing  the 
animal and buying a certified animal. This leaves a 
proportion Ф* of buyers who buy with certification. 
The outcome of this scenario is that a proportion, 
θ0 – Ф*,  test  the  animals  after  purchase  and  a 
proportion,  (1 – θ0  ),  do  not.  Here,  certification 
serves as a way for the seller to signal the "disease 
free"  status  of  his  animal.  In  this  particular  case, 
certification does not reduce the negative externality 
that arises due to trade involving infected animals. 
What  takes  place  in  practice  here  is,  therefore,  a 
transfer of responsibility for animal testing from the 
buyer  to  the  seller  with  the  result  that  there  is  a 
proportion of buyers, who, rather than testing, buy 
with certification. 
C. Scenario 3. The Inefficacy of Certification  
When prefs is superior to prefb2 , Ф* = 0 and the 
supply curve does not cross the demand curve. In 
this  case,  certification  is  inefficient,  and, 
consequently, neither the buyer nor the seller gains a 
surplus, and the proportion of safe trade does not 
increase.  
IV. A POSSIBLE OPTIMISATION BY THE DECISION-MAKER 
In  the  preceding  section,  we  described  market 
equilibrium  and  identified  the  different  scenarios 
under  which  certification  enhances  the  level  of 
farmers' surplus and the level of positive externality 
which arises therein. In this section, we consider the 
possible  interventions  available  to  the  decision-
maker,  i.e.,  the  public-choice  maker  or  such 
producers'  associations  as  GDS  interested  in 
reducing negative externality and increasing farmers' 
surplus.  
In  the  context  of  our  model,  it  is  socially 
beneficial to introduce TPC when the sum of buyers' 
and  sellers'  surpluses  derived  from  certification  is 
greater  than  the  cost  of  management  of  the  TPC 
supported  by  the  decision-maker.  However, 
considering  Scenario  1,  even  if  the  cost  of 
management is higher than the sum of buyers' and 
sellers' surpluses, the decision-maker might find the 
introduction of certification in the interest of society 
since  doing  so  reduces  the  negative  externality 
resulting from infection.  
Our  model  also  allows  the  decision-maker  to 
support the testing on farm of traded animals and 
bear  the  cost  of  certification  in  order  to  reduce 
negative externality. In both cases, support leads to a 
sub-optimum  equilibrium  whereby  the  net  social 
surplus,  composed  of  farmers'  surplus  minus 
decision-maker's cost, is reduced. But such a support 
can improve the level of trade safety as it improves 
farmers'  welfare  by  reducing  the  risk  of  infection 
and,  consequently,  the  level  of  disease  prevalence 
among  farms.  Considering  Scenario  1  again,  the 
provision of support for certification increases the 
value of Φ*, so decreases externality due to the trade 
by  increasing  the  proportion  of  safe  trade.  But 
provision  of  support  for  testing  of  animals  after 
purchase is of no value because no farmer tests his 
animal. In Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, support for the 
test at the point of purchase is always efficient and 
decreases  the  externality  due  to  the  trade.  But 
support for certification increases the sellers' surplus 
at the expense of the social surplus. 
Given our assumptions, we show that it is never 
efficient for the decision-maker to support both the 
certification and the test at introduction, the choice 
to support either one must be made taking account 
of the scenario observed.  
V. DISCUSSION 
The  theoretical  framework  developed  in  this 
paper  should  be  seen  as  a  first  attempt  towards 
analysing the full impact of animal health status on 
equilibrium  in  the  cattle  market.  It  serves  as  a 
starting point for a rigorous study of the negative 
externality resulting from the exchange of infected   9 
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animals  and  as  a  guide  for  the  management  of 
information  regarding  animal  diseases.  By 
determining the choice of actors in the market in the 
face of incomplete information, we have shown that 
Third  Party  Certification  and  Conventional 
Warranty  cannot  coexist  because  all  actors  in  the 
market find the former more efficient than the latter. 
This seems to be consistent with findings from other 
markets  (Dewally  and  Ederington,  2006). 
Furthermore, we have shown that, with Third Party 
Certification, sellers' surplus increases and that for 
such a scheme to increase buyers' surplus and reduce 
the negative externality associated with infection, it 
must  first  drive  out  the  practice  of  testing  after 
purchase from the market. In this respect, we offer a 
rough  guide  for  decision-makers  to  reduce  the 
negative externality by supporting either the "testing 
after purchase" or "certification" schemes. We find 
that  the  decision-maker  has  to  select  to  support 
either mechanism but never both of them.  
Given  the  simplified  assumptions  used  in  the 
model, however, the results should be treated with 
caution. We assume in our model that the price of an 
animal  without  certification  and  the  number  of 
animals  sold  are  given.  However,  in  practice,  the 
benefits  to  the  seller  and  to  the  buyer,  which  are 
higher  with  certification,  might  modify  the  global 
supply  and  demand  conditions.  Furthermore,  we 
assume that the global demand and supply are fixed 
and, as such, we do not describe supply and demand 
curves  for  animals.  Nevertheless,  the 
aforementioned theoretical framework can be further 
extended to show how the global quantity supplied 
and demanded and the price can change over time. 
Also, price without certification can change because 
premium  price  has  a  direct  impact  on  the  disease 
prevalence of uncertified animals. In effect, animals 
free of the disease are preferentially sold with the 
premium price. So there are more infected animals 
sold without certification. 
In our model, the disease prevalence and the risk 
in the market without certification are assumed to be 
known by farmers. But in practice, farmers have just 
a  limited  perception  of  the  risk  and  its  evolution. 
The  study  of  this  perceived  risk,  and  of  how 
producers cope with this risk can provide an avenue 
for  a  useful  collaboration  with  sociologist.  In  our 
conceptual  framework,  limited  perception  can  be 
modelled by assuming a perceived prevalence and a 
perceived  risk  different  from  the  actual  risk.  The 
existence of a gap between perceived risk and actual 
risk results in a suboptimal equilibrium. A principal-
agent approach can be developed to determine the 
maximum such benefit as done in a previous work 
on food labelling (See, for instance, Marette, 2005). 
By  describing  the  principal  as  the  decision-maker 
and buyers and sellers as agents, we can describe the 
rationale  for  testing,  for  certification  and  for 
advertising  the  risk  through  different  signals.  Our 
modelling  framework  can  also  describe  regulatory 
means such as the warranty of latent defect and the 
testing after purchase. 
We assume in our model that disease prevalence 
is  given  exogenously.  But  we  have  shown  that, 
following  certification,  disease  prevalence  can 
change  because  of  the  lessening  of  the  effect  of 
externality.  Furthermore,  the  model  considers  the 
choice of certification just as a trade choice. But the 
process of certification can also be motivated with 
the view to protecting farm objectives as the farmer 
controls  his  animals  to  manage  the  disease  in  his 
herd.  As  an  extension  of  this  framework,  we 
envisage  to  undertake  a  dynamic  model  that  has 
economic  and  epidemiological  components  with  a 
particular  focus  on  a  disease  like  BVDV  or 
paratuberculosis and that is empirically testable.  
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Annex 1: Derivation of equation 2 
Let α=P+Ct, the cost of buying an animal, and β=(P+Ct-Pc+Co), the cost of culling and of buying another 
animal when the first one is infected. Because the probability of buying an infected animal is π , the probability 
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Annex 2: The incompatibility of Conventional Warranty and Third Party Certification 
We assume that Cr, the cash back for the buyer when he returns an animal with Conventional Warranty 
satisfies: 
 
' + + ≤ ≤ + Co Ct P Cr Ct P CW CW .  (A2a) 
 
So, the cost for the buyer is higher than or equal to the cost with a perfect warranty, and 
 
Ct P C CW CW + ≥   (A2b) 
 
 
A buyer who trades in a market with Conventional Warranty requires that 
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A seller who trades in a market  with Conventional Warranty requires that 
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Because of (A2c)   (A2d) 
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